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Abstract—Fueled by the rapid development of communication
networks and sensors in portable devices, today many mobile
users are invited by content providers to sense and send back
real-time useful information (e.g., traffic observations and sensor
data) to keep the freshness of the providers’ content updates.
However, due to the sampling cost in sensing and transmission,
an individual may not have the incentive to contribute the real-
time information to help a content provider reduce the age
of information (AoI). Accordingly, we propose dynamic pricing
for the provider to offer age-dependent monetary returns and
encourage users to sample information at different rates over
time. This dynamic pricing design problem needs to balance
the monetary payments to users and the AoI evolution over
time, and is challenging to solve especially under the incomplete
information about users’ arrivals and their private sampling
costs. For analysis tractability, we linearize the nonlinear AoI
evolution in the constrained dynamic programming problem, by
approximating the dynamic AoI reduction as a time-average term
and solving the approximate dynamic pricing in closed-form.
Then, we estimate this approximate term based on Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem. Finally, we provide the steady-state analysis
of the optimized approximate dynamic pricing scheme for an
infinite time horizon, and show that the pricing scheme can
be further simplified to an ε-optimal version without recursive
computing over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many customers today prefer not to miss any useful in-
formation or breaking news even if in minute, making it
imperative for a content provider to keep the posted infor-
mation fresh to attract a good number of customers for profit
[1], [2]. The real-time information can be traffic condition,
news, sales promotion, and air quality index, and they will
gradually become outdated and useless over time. To keep
information fresh, many content providers such as Waze and
CrowdSpark now invite and pay the mobile crowd including
smartphone users and drivers to sample real-time information
frequently [3]. Such crowdsensing approach also avoids a
content provider’s own deployment of an expensive fixed
sensor network across the city or nation. The fast development
of wireless communication networks and sensors in portable
devices enables the mobile users to contribute real-time infor-
mation.
Age of information (AoI) is recently proposed as an im-
portant performance metric to quantify the freshness of the
information in these online applications. The literature focuses
on the technological issues of the AoI such as the frequency of
status updates and queueing delay analysis. In [4], the commu-
nication time of the status update systems is considered, and
it proves the existence of an optimal packet generation rate at
a source to keep its status as timely as possible. Noting the
time-varying availability of energy at the source will affect
the update packet transmission rate, [5] derives an offline
solution that minimizes both the time average age and the
peak age for an arbitrary energy replenishment. [6] shows
a counter-intuitive phenomenon that zero-wait policy, i.e., a
fresh update is submitted once the previous update is delivered,
does not always minimize the age. Considering random packet
arrivals, [7] studies how to keep many customers updated over
a wireless broadcast network and a Markov decision process
(MDP) is formulated to find dynamic scheduling algorithms.
For the analysis tractability, the Peak Age-of-Information
(PAoI) metric, which is the average maximum age before a
new update is received, was first considered in [8] for a single-
class M/M/1 queueing system.
However, the economic issues of controlling AoI for content
providers are largely overlooked in the literature. On one
hand, individuals incur sampling costs when sense and send
back their real-time information to content providers, and
they should be rewarded and well motivated to contribute
their information updates [3]. On the other hand, a large
crowdsensing pool implies a large total sampling cost to
compensate, which should be taken into account in a content
provider’s sustainable management of its AoI [9], [10]. As AoI
changes over time, the pricing should be dynamic and age-
dependent to best balance the AoI evolution and the sampling
cost to compensate, yet this dynamic programming problem
is usually difficult to solve due to the curse of dimensionality.
Further, we face another challenge for optimally deciding
a provider’s dynamic pricing: incomplete information about
users’ private sampling costs and their random arrival to help
sample. Individuals are different in nature and incur different
sampling costs to reflect their heterogeneity (e.g., in battery
energy storage and privacy concern when sampling). A user
will accept the price if his sampling cost is less than the
price offered by the provider, yet the provider does not know
such private cost when deciding pricing. In addition, users are
mobile and their arrivals in the target area to sense is random.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first work studying
the dynamic pricing issue for controlling a content provider’s
AoI. Under incomplete information, we study how the provider
should decide its dynamic pricing to minimize the discounted
AoI and monetary payment over time, by taking into account
the private sampling costs of users and random user arrival in
Fig. 1: Illustration of information update process under the
content provider’s dynamic pricing and random user arrival.
the target area. After formulating this problem as a nonlinear
dynamic program in Section II, for analysis tractability, we lin-
earize the nonlinear AoI evolution in the constrained dynamic
programming problem in Section III, by using a time-average
term to estimate the dynamic AoI reduction in approximate
sense and successfully solving the dynamic pricing scheme in
closed-form. Then we determine the time-average estimator,
based on Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. Section IV further
provides the steady-state analysis of the approximate dynamic
pricing scheme for an infinite time horizon. It is shown that
the approximate dynamic pricing can be further simplified to
an ε-optimal version without recursive computing over time.
Finally, Section V draws the conclusion of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We illustrate the information update process at the content
provider side in Fig. 1. We consider a discrete time horizon
with time slot t = 0, 1, · · · . The provider first announces price
p(t) at the beginning of time slot t, and a user may arrive
randomly in this time slot and (if so) he further decides to
sample or not based on the price p(t) and its own sampling
cost π. If the user appears and accepts to sample (π ≤ p(t)),
its sensor data (e.g., about traffic and road condition) is
transmitted with fixed delay A0 to finally reach the end
customers (who use the content provider’s app).
As in [7], we consider that the users’ random arrivals in the
target area (to the content provider’s interest) are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time slots, by following
a Bernoulli distribution. As shown in Fig. 1, if a user arrives
in time slot t, s(t) = 1; otherwise, s(t) = 0, where the
probability of one user arrival in each time slot is α, i.e.,
P(s(t) = 1) = α. Each time slot’s duration is properly selected
such that there is at most one user arrival at a time. Further, the
users’ sampling costs are i.i.d. according to a cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) F (π), π ∈ [0, b]. Though all potential
users’ costs follow the same distribution, their realized costs
are different in general. Under the incomplete information,
the provider does not know the users’ arrivals for potential
sampling over time t or the arriving user’s particular cost π.
It only knows the user arrival probability α in each time slot
and the cost distribution F (π).
We adopt the Age of Information (AoI) as the performance
metric to quantify the freshness of the information packet
at end-customer side. Let A(t) be the AoI at the beginning
of time slot t. Considering a linearly increasing actual age
over time as in Fig. 2 for the discrete time horizon, the new
Fig. 2: Actual age A(t) over time under dynamic pricing p(t).
age A(t + 1) at time t + 1 increases by one, i.e., A(t) + 1,
if the information is not updated by any user at time t. If
a user arrives in time t and further accepts the price p(t),
i.e., π ≤ p(t), a new status packet will be generated and
transmitted. Without much loss of generality, we assume the
status sampling and transmission are accomplished within a
time slot,1 then the transmission delay is fixed to A0 ≤ 1 and
the age A(t+1) at time t+1 decreases to A0 if an update is
received. Then, the dynamics of the actual AoI is given as
A(t+ 1) =
{
A0, if π ≤ p(t);
A(t) + 1, otherwise.
(1)
Given the cumulative distribution function of an arriving
user’s cost F (π), the probability that a user will appear and
accept the price at time t is αF (p(t)). Considering uniform
distribution for the users’ private costs (i.e., F (π) = π
b
, π ∈
[0, b]), the expected age at time t+ 1 is
A(t+ 1) =A0αF (p(t)) + (A(t) + 1)(1− αF (p(t)))
=A(t)− (A(t) −A0)α
p(t)
b
+ (1− α
p(t)
b
),
(2)
which tells nonlinear AoI evolution due to the product between
A(t) and p(t) above.
Since the probability that a user appears and accepts the
price p(t) is αp(t)
b
, the expected payment to the user is
αp2(t)
b
. Note that the optimal price p(t) should not exceed the
maximum cost b of the user. The objective of the provider
is to find the optimal dynamic pricing p(t), t ∈ [0, ..., T ]
that minimizes the expected total discounted cost, which is
the summation of the square age and monetary payment in
expected sense:
U(T ) = min
p(t)∈[0,b],t∈[0,...,T ]
T∑
t=0
ρt(A2(t) +
αp2(t)
b
), (3)
s.t. A(t+1) = A(t)− (A(t)−A0)α
p(t)
b
+(1−α
p(t)
b
), (2)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discounted factor and we choose the
square age A2(t) to reflect the fact that the provider’s profit
loss should be convexly increasing in its age.
The problem in (2)-(3) is a constrained nonlinear dynamic
program, which is challenging to solve analytically due to
1This is feasible provided with the upcoming ultra-reliable and low-latency
5G communications.
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(a) Approximate dynamic pricing p(t)
versus time t.
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(b) Expected age A(t) versus time t.
0 20 40 60 80 100
time t
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Q t
(c) Qt versus time t.
0 20 40 60 80 100
time t
0
0.5
1
1.5
M
t
(d) Mt versus time t.
Fig. 3: Dynamics of price p(t), expected age A(t), Qt, and Mt over time for finite horizon T = 100.
the curse of dimensionality. We can imagine that, a huge
number of combinations of the time-dependent prices p(t), t ∈
[0, ..., T ] must be jointly designed, and the computation com-
plexity O(bT ) is formidably high by increasing exponentially
in T . To analytically solve this problem for obtaining useful
insights, we will propose a problem approximation in the
following section.
III. APPROXIMATION OF DYNAMIC PRICING
To analytically obtain the optimal dynamic prices p(t), t ∈
[0, ..., T ] for the constrained dynamic problem in (3), we
reformulate the nonlinear dynamics of the expected age in
(2) into linear dynamics. Specifically, we propose a time-
average term δ as an estimator to approximate the dynamic
age reduction A(t)−A0 per update in (2), i.e.,
A(t+ 1) = A(t) − δα
p(t)
b
+ (1− α
p(t)
b
), (4)
where the time-average estimator δ also takes into account the
time discount factor ρ, i.e.,2
δ =
1− ρ
1− ρT
T−1∑
t=0
ρt(A(t) −A0). (5)
In the following, we first assume the estimator δ is known
for analyzing the approximate dynamic pricing in Section
III-A. Later in Section III-B, we will show how to determine
the estimator δ for pricing update.
A. Analysis of approximate dynamic pricing
Though the dynamic programming problem (3)-(4) now has
only linear AoI evolution constraint in (4), it is still not easy to
solve by considering the huge number of price combinations
over time. We denote the cost function with initial time t as
J(p, t) =
T∑
s=t
ρs−t(A2(t) +
α
b
p2(t)), (6)
and denote the value function as
V (A(t), t) = min
{p(s)∈[0,b]}T
s=t
(J(p, t)|A(t)). (7)
Then, we have the dynamic programming equation:
V (A(t), t) = min
p(t)∈[0,b]
(A2(t) +
α
b
p
2(t) + ρV (A(t+ 1), t+ 1)),
(8)
2There is no need to include A(T ) in δ, as it will not affect the AoI A(t)
at previous time slot t ≤ T − 1.
subject to (4).
In the following, we first analyze the unconstrained dynamic
problem (8) by using dynamic control techniques. Later in
Section IV, the constraint p(t) ∈ [0, b] will be added back and
examined.
Proposition 3.1: The approximate dynamic pricing p(t), t ∈
{0, ..., T } as an optimal solution to the unconstrained dynamic
program (8) is increasing in A(t) and given by
p(t) =
ρMt+1(δ + 1) + 2ρ(δ + 1)Qt+1(A(t) + 1)
2 + 2ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (9)
and the resulting expected age A(t) at time t is
A(t) =
t∏
i=1
1
1 + ρQi
α(δ+1)2
b
A(0) +
2− ρMt
α(δ+1)2
b
2 + 2ρQt
α(δ+1)2
b
+
t−1∑
s=1
2− ρMs
α(δ+1)2
b
2 + 2ρQs
α(δ+1)2
b
t∏
i=s+1
1
1 + ρQi
α(δ+1)2
b
,
(10)
where
Qt = 1 +
ρQt+1
1 + ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (11)
Mt =
ρ(Mt+1 + 2Qt+1)
1 + ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
, (12)
with p(T ) = 0, QT = 1,MT = 0. Fig. 3 illustrates their
dynamics over time.
Proof Sketch: According to
∂V (A(t),t)
∂p(t) = 0, we can observe
that p(t) is a linear function of A(t). Thus, the value function
should be in the following quadratic structure:
V (A(t), t) = QtA
2(t) +MtA(t) + St, (13)
yet we still need to determine Qt,Mt, St. This will be accom-
plished by finding the recursion in the following.
First, we have QT = 1,MT = 0, ST = 0 due to
V (A(T ), T ) = A2(T ). Given V (A(t+1), t+1) = Qt+1A
2(t+
1)+Mt+1A(t+1)+St+1 as in (13), the dynamic programming
equation at time t is
V (A(t), t) =min
p(t)
(
A2(t) +
α
b
p2(t) + ρQt+1A
2(t+ 1)
+ ρMt+1A(t+ 1) + ρSt+1
)
.
(14)
Insert (4) into (14) and let
∂V (A(t),t)
∂p(t) = 0, we have
the optimal price p(t) as given in (9). Then, insert p(t) in
(9) into V (A(t), t) in (14), we have V (A(t), t) as a func-
tion of Qt+1,Mt+1, St+1 and A(t). Thus, by reformulating
V (A(t), t) in (14) and noting that V (A(t), t) = QtA
2(t) +
MtA(t) + St, we obtain the recursive relationships in (11)
and (12). Insert p(t) in (9) into (4), we obtain the expected
age A(t) in (10).
In the simulation results of Fig. 3, we can see that the
dynamic pricing p(t) first decreases with the expected ageA(t)
until both of them reach steady-states, which is consistent with
the proportional relationship between p(t) and A(t) in (9). But
when close to the end of the time horizon T , the price p(t)
decreases to 0 to save sampling expense without worrying its
negative effect on the age. The expected age A(t) increases
again but only lasts for a few time slots. Noting that Qt and
Mt are computed in backward recursion over time, we can
see that both Qt and Mt fast converge, which will be strictly
proved in Section IV.
B. Update of estimator δ for pricing
Now we are ready to update the estimator δ (which ap-
proximately linearizes (2) as (4)) for dynamic pricing in (9)
and find the fixed point to fit (5). We should also note that
this fixed point may or may not exist. Note that the estimator
δ in (5) is affected by all the ages A(t) over the time
horizon t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}, which will in turn affect A(t).
Thus, according to (10), A(t) is a function of all the ages
{A(t), t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}} over time and we need to find the
estimator δ such that it replicates 1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t)−A0)
in (5) as we initially assumed.
For any 1 ≤ t ≤ T−1, we insert δ = 1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t)−
A0) into A(t) in (10), and define
Φt(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)) = A(t). (15)
Then, we have the following vector function for t ∈ [1, T−1]:
Φ(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)) (16)
=(Φ1(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1)), · · · ,ΦT−1(A(1), · · · , A(T − 1))).
According to (15), the fixed point in Φ(A(1), ..., A(T −1)) =
(A(1), ..., A(T −1)) should be reached to tell that δ replicates
1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t) −A0).
Note that Qt ≥ 1 in (11), Mt ≥ 0 in (12), we have
Φt ≤ A(0) + t. (17)
Define Ω = [0, A(0) + 1] × · · · × [0, A(0) + (T − 1)]. Since
Φt is continuous in Ω, Φ is a continuous mapping from Ω to
Ω. According to the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2: Φ has a fixed point in Ω.
Given the existence of the fixed point, we are ready to find
the estimator δ that is consistent with our approximation as-
sumption in (5). Accordingly, we propose Algorithm 1: given
any initial estimator δest(j) in round j, we can iteratively
obtain the resulting expected ages A(t), t ∈ [1, T − 1] accord-
ing to (10), and then check whether the resulting estimator
δest(j + 1) in next round coincides with the initial estimator
δest(j). By repeating the process until δest(j + 1) = δest(j),
we obtain the fixed point δ and the computation complexity
of Algorithm 1 is O(T
ǫ
).
Algorithm 1 Iterative computation of fixed point estimator δ
1: ǫ = 1, j = 1, an arbitary initial δest(0) ≥ 0, δ = δest(0)
2: while ǫ > 0.001 do
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: Compute Qt and Mt according to δ, (11), (12)
5: end for
6: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
7: Compute A(t) according to (10)
8: end for
9: δest(j) = 1−ρ1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A(t) −A0)
10: δ = δest(j)
11: ǫ = δest(j)− δest(j − 1)
12: j = j + 1
13: end while
14: return Fixed point δ
IV. STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC PRICING
We wonder how our approximate dynamic pricing and its
performance would be in the steady-state, by looking at the
infinite time horizon T →∞ in this section. Specifically, the
steady-state characterizations of Qt in (11) and Mt in (12)
can be found by iterating the dynamic equations until they
converge. The following lemma shows the steady-states of Qt
and Mt, both of which exist and are nicely given in closed-
form.
Lemma 4.1: As T →∞, Qt and Mt respectively converge
to the steady-states:
Q =
1
2
(
1−
b(1− ρ)
ρα(δ + 1)2
+
√
(1−
b(1− ρ)
ρα(δ + 1)2
)2 +
4b
ρα(δ + 1)2
)
,
(18)
M =
2ρQ
1− ρ+ ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
. (19)
Proof: Since both Qt = 1 +
ρQt+1
1+ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
in (11)
and Mt =
ρ(Mt+1+2Qt+1)
1+ρQt+1
α(δ+1)2
b
in (12) increase with Qt+1 and
Mt+1, respectively, we can conclude that {QT , QT−1, ...} and
{MT ,MT−1, ...} are increasing sequences and converge to the
steady state Q and M , respectively. By removing the time
subscripts from (11) and (12), we can show the steady-state
Q and M exist and are given in (18) and (19), respectively.
For the infinity horizon case, the optimal price changes from
(9) to
p∞(t) =
ρM(δ + 1) + 2ρ(δ + 1)Q(A(t) + 1)
2 + 2ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
, (20)
where Q and M are given in (18) and (19), respectively.
Then, according to the dynamic AoI evolution in (4), we
have
A∞(t) =(
1
1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)tA(0)
+
2− ρM α(δ+1)
2
b
2 + 2ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
1− ( 1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)t
1− 1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
.
(21)
By noting that 1
1+ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
< 1 and M in (19), we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: As t→∞, the expected AoI is given as:
lim
t→∞
A∞(t) =
(1− ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
ρQ(δ + 1)2(α
b
(1 − ρ) + ρQ(α(δ+1)
b
)2)
, (22)
and the optimal dynamic price converges to
lim
t→∞
p∞(t) =
b
α(δ + 1)
. (23)
In the following, we will show how to analytically find the
fixed point estimator δ of AoI reduction in infinite horizon and
recall that we can only numerically compute it by Algorithm 1
in Section III-B for finite time horizon. Note that δ is estimated
by 1−ρ
1−ρT
∑T−1
t=0 ρ
t(A∞(t) − A0). Since A
∞(t) converges to
the constant in (22), as T → ∞, we can solve the estimator
δ as the unique solution to
(1− ρ)(1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
)
ρQ(δ + 1)2(α
b
(1 − ρ) + ρQ(α(δ+1)
b
)2)
−A0 − δ = 0, (24)
which describes the time-average AoI reduction due to user
sampling and only non-negative δ solution makes sense.
According to (24), we can obtain the fixed point δ without
using Algorithm 1 iteratively.
Then, we also add back the constraint p(t) ∈ [0, b] in
dynamic program (8) to examine, which is relaxed in previous
Section III-A for simplifying our analysis, and have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: Both δ ≥ 0 and limt→∞ p(t) ∈ [0, b] are
satisfied to be reasonable if
2b(1− ρ)
αρ
(
1− b(1−ρ)
ρα
+
√
(1− b(1−ρ)
ρα
)2 + 4b
ρα
) ≥ A0, α ≥ 1
δ + 1
.
(25)
Proof: By checking the monotonic property of (24) regard-
ing δ, we can prove the uniqueness of the fixed point estimator
δ. Then, we show the the condition for δ ≥ 0. Rewrite (24) as
α
b
=
ρQ(α(δ+1)
b
)2(δ +A0)
1− ρ
(1−
ρ
1 + ρQα(δ+1)
2
b
). (26)
Denote the right-hand side of (26) as v(δ). We can check
v(δ) increases with δ. Thus, if α
b
≥ v(δ = 0), we have
δ ≥ 0. Since v(δ = 0) <
ρQ(α
b
)2(δ+A0)
1−ρ , thus we only need
α
b
≥
ρQ(α
b
)2(δ+A0)
1−ρ to satisfy, which is rewritten as the first
inequation in (25). According to (23), limt→∞ p
∞(t) ≤ b
always holds given α ≥ 1
δ+1 and δ ≥ 0.
The condition for reasonable δ and p(t) in (25) is likely to
hold in many cases. For example, if the transmission delay A0
is small in a crowded area with large α, limt→∞ p(t) ∈ [0, b]
always holds. Actually, under the conditions in (25), we can
safely use the dynamic pricing p(t) in (9) for finite horizon
case. If p(t) > b at the first few time slots due to high initial
age A(0), we can set p(t) = b to ensure the users (if arrive) to
contribute and thus the expected age A(t) will decrease until
p(t) ≤ b. Then, from that time on, p(t) ∈ [0, b] in (9) is always
satisfied under the conditions in (25).
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Fig. 4: U∞(T )− U(T ) versus time horizon T .
A. ε-optimality for Expected Discounted Cost
We note that the approximate dynamic pricing is further
simplified to (20) with the lowest possible computation order
O(1) by using the steady-states Q in (18) and M in (19) for
infinite time horizon. It is unlike (9) which still recursively
updates Qt in (11) and Mt in (12) for finite horizon case.
By using this simple dynamic price p∞(t) without recursive
computing over time, we wonder its performance and denote
the resulting expected discounted cost for finite horizon T
as U∞(T ). According to Lemma 4.1 and Squeeze Theorem,
in the following proposition, we prove that U∞(T ) is ε-
optimal compared with the expected discounted cost U(T )
under approximate dynamic pricing p(t) in (9).
Proposition 4.3: ∀ T > 0, there always exists an εT > 0
such that
U(T ) ≤ U∞(T ) ≤ U(T ) + εT , (27)
and we have limT→∞ εT = 0 for a sufficiently large T .
Proof: Since Qt,Mt converge to the steady state Q,M ,
respectively, there exists a t0 such that for any t ≤ T − t0,
Qt = Q and Mt = M . Then, for any t ≤ T − t0, we have
A(t) = A∞(t). Moreover, according to (9) and (20), we have
p(t) = p∞(t) = 1
K
for any t ≤ T−t0. Therefore, the expected
discounted cost can be rewrite as
U(T ) =
T∑
t=0
ρt(A2(t) + cp2(t))
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
+
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρt(A2(t) + cp2(t))
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2) + ε1(T ).
(28)
Denote U¯ = max(A2(t) + cp2(t)|t ∈ [T − t0 + 1, T ]) and
U = min(A2(t) + cp2(t)|t ∈ [T − t0 + 1, T ]). Then, we have
ε1(T ) ≤
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρtU¯ = U¯
ρT−t0+1(1 − ρt0)
1− ρ
, (29)
and
ε1(T ) ≥
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρtU = U
ρT−t0+1(1− ρt0)
1− ρ
. (30)
As T → ∞, we have U¯ ρ
T−t0+1(1−ρt0 )
1−ρ = 0 and
U ρ
T−t0+1(1−ρt0 )
1−ρ = 0. Thus, according to Squeeze Theorem,
we have
lim
T→∞
ε1(T ) = 0. (31)
For finite horizon with steady state Q,M , we have
U∞(T ) =
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
+
T∑
t=T−t0+1
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2)
=
T−t0∑
t=0
ρt((A∞(t))2 + c(p∞(t))2) + ε2(T ).
(32)
Similarly, we can show that limT→∞ ε2(T ) = 0. Since p(t)
in (9) is the optimal price for finite horizon, we have U(T ) ≤
U∞(T ). Combine (28) and (32), we can see that for ∀ T > 0,
there always exists a εT > 0 such that U
∞(T ) ≤ U(T ) + εT
with limT→∞ εT = 0.
As shown in Fig. 4, the difference between U∞(T ) and
U(T ) reduces as T increases, which approaches 0 for suffi-
ciently large T . This is consistent with this proposition and
tells that the simple pricing in (20) performs well once T is
large (not necessarily infinite).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studies the dynamic pricing that
minimizes the discounted AoI and payment over time. We have
formulated this problem as a constrained nonlinear dynamic
process under incomplete information about users’ random
arrival and private sampling costs. For analysis tractability,
we linearize the nonlinear AoI evolution in the constrained
dynamic programming problem by using the weighted time-
average age to estimate the dynamic AoI reduction. It is shown
that the estimator is appropriately designed to replicate the
time-average term initially assumed. We further analyze the
steady-state of the approximate dynamic pricing for infinite
horizon and show that, as time goes to infinity, the approximate
dynamic pricing can be further simplified to an ε-optimal
version without recursive computing over time.
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